I. INTRODUCTION
"When misinformation causes loss, it is small comfort to the investor to know that he has been bilked by negligent mistake rather than by fraudulent design, particularly when recovery of his loss has been foreclosed by this Court's decisions."
1 Courts have been analyzing various Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules since the SEC was established, to determine on a rule-by-rule basis, if scienter 2 is an element that the Commission must prove in order to prevail in civil enforcement actions. 3 In early 2008, executives of Thornburg Mortgage (Thornburg), a publicly traded company, disseminated information to auditors to prepare the company's 2007 form 10-K. 4 Thornburg had a tough year in 2007; the weakening real estate market decreased the company's investment values, resulting in margin calls on its investment loans. 5 Despite this, the executives prepared a letter to Thornburg's outside auditor overstating the financial condition of the company. 6 Based on this information, the auditors agreed that the losses were temporary and did not need to be disclosed to shareholders. [Vol. 10:317 unemployment and stock market declines. 22 While the reasons for the depression are debated, varied, and mostly beyond the scope of this article, manipulation of the securities markets was a contributing factor. 23 In the wake of the Great Depression, securities and banking legislation was enacted to increase transparency and prevent the scenarios that contributed to the economic decline from recurring. 24 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was passed during this period and was the legislation that created the SEC. 25 The SEC is an independent administrative agency 26 of the Executive Branch of the United States Government. 27 The Commission's original purpose was to restore investor confidence by ensuring that the companies, brokers, and exchanges disseminated honest information, putting investors' interests before their own. 28 The current mission statement of the Commission is "to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation." 29 The SEC uses a number of key functions to carry out its mission. 30 The Commission interprets existing federal securities laws and creates new rules to further its goals. 31 The Commission provides oversight of broker-dealers, ratings agencies, and self-regulatory organizations ("SRO") and enforces securities laws and rules. 32 
B. SEC Rulemaking
The SEC creates rules within the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") guidelines. 33 Rules are usually created at the direction of an enabling act 34 or one of the rulemaking divisions within the Commission: 22 the Market Regulation, Corporate Finance, or Investment Management divisions. 35 As in other administrative contexts, the rulemaking process consists of three general steps. 36 First, the Commission may begin with a concept release, outlining a problem that needs to be solved and seeking proposed solutions from the public to remedy the problem. 37 Next, the APA requires the Commission to publish a proposed rule in the Federal Register. 38 Interested parties are given an opportunity to voice support for or concerns about the proposed rule and to participate in the rulemaking process. 39 The final rule, including any changes proposed and accepted during the notice and comment period, is then published in the Federal Register. 40 
C. SEC Investigation and Enforcement
Many types of conduct can trigger an SEC investigation of potential SEC rule violations. 41 The SEC engages in market surveillance, receives tips and complaints from investors, and coordinates with other governmental entities to uncover possible rule violations and initiate investigations. 42 A thorough investigation is conducted using methods such as reviewing financial records and interviewing associated parties. 43 After a case is developed, it is presented to the Commissioners to decide what, if any, remedy should be sought. 44 The SEC may pursue various remedies to thwart ongoing violations of law or seek justice for violations that have occurred. 45 The SEC is limited to civil enforcement of the federal securities laws. 46 A panoply of remedial mechanisms exist: a cease and desist order to stop ongoing activities, an injunction to prevent future violations, monetary penalties (fines) to punish and discourage future violations, and disgorgement to prevent unjust enrichment from ill-gotten gains. 47 Criminal enforcement may be sought 35 David S. Ruder, Balancing Investor Protection with Capital Formation Needs After the SEC Chamber of Commerce Case, 26 PACE L. REV. 39, 52 (2005) . 36 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 27. 37 See id. 38 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015) . 39 Id. 40 
Id.

41
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 27. 42 Id. 43 See id. 44 See id. The focus here is on a specific SEC Rule: 13b2-2. Concern for the accuracy of financial statements was addressed in section 11 of the original Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 49 Section 11 allowed for investors to sue directors and officers for rescission or damages for losses resulting from material misinformation or omissions. 50 Showing a reasonable belief in the information when it was communicated allows directors and officers to avoid liability. 51 The same is true today.
52
In the 1970s, a Watergate Special Prosecutor's investigation uncovered hundreds of illegal bribes by domestic corporations to foreign political officials. 53 The SEC suggested a new set of rules to supplement the 1934 Act to, among other things, "prohibit the making of false, misleading or incomplete statements to an accountant in connections with any examination or audit" used to cover up such bribes. 54 As a result, Congress adopted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977, and created section 13(b)(2) of the 1934 Act.
Born from this new legislation, Rule 13b2-2 was intended to "encourage careful and accurate communications between auditors and issuers from whom they request information during the audit process, deter the making of false, misleading or incomplete statements to accountants, and thereby enhance the integrity of the financial disclosure system." 55 During the notice and comment period for the original Rule, commenters expressed concern for the lack of a scienter requirement. 56 The Commission responded that a scienter requirement would be inconsistent with section 13(b)(2), which indicated no congressional intent to impose a scienter requirement. 57 The enabling statute for the modern Rule 13b2-2 is section 303(a) of 48 Id. at 1275. Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"). 58 It was created in the wake of the stock market decline and accounting scandals which marked the first two years of the new millennium. 59 A number of well-known publicly traded companies filed for bankruptcy protection during this period, including Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications, and Tyco International. 60 These corporations perpetrated accounting fraud in cooperation with large accounting firms, costing investors billions of dollars and eroding the public confidence in the securities markets. 61 Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to the accounting fraud, market decline, and drop in investor confidence to prevent a repeat of history.
62
In furtherance of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC initiated rulemaking to create Rule 13b2-2, intended to replace Rule 13B-2.
63 Rule 13b2-2 was proposed on October 18, 2002.
64 After a notice and comment period, the Rule was enacted on June 26, 2003. 65 The new Rule is composed of three sections.
Rule 13b2-2(a)
Section (a) prohibits directors or officers of an issuer from directly or indirectly making material false statements or omissions to accountants in connection with audits or financial statements intended for audit purposes or for SEC filings. conform to generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"), failing to report in violation of GAAP, and failing to disclose or withdraw a report after it has been deemed misleading. The Supreme Court has defined scienter as "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 69 Black's Law Dictionary defines scienter as "a degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission."
70
Recklessness can also constitute scienter. 71 The conduct of a corporate officer is reckless when that officer is acting with an "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care" and in a way that can cause misleading information to reach the investing public, if the danger that misleading information can reach the investing public is known or when the danger is so clear that it should have been known.
72
Proving scienter requires a demonstration of the defendant's state of mind. 73 For the SEC to prevail in an enforcement action which contains a scienter element, the Commission must show that the defendant knew or should have known that their act or omission was fraudulent. 74 Scienter is typically the most difficult element of a crime to prove because of the difficulty in proving a state of mind.
75
Complexities in proving scienter make it the element defendants frequently use as a basis for dismissal of charges. 76 Complications arise when a representative, genuinely ignorant of the falsity of the information provided to them, disseminates the false information. collective scienter attempts to remedy this situation. 78 Collective scienter attributes the requisite scienter to the organization as a whole when the individuals perpetrating the underlying fraud cannot be identified. 79 Many jurisdictions reject collective scienter and continue to require the scienter of the individual asserting the fraudulent information to be proven.
80
A comparison of scienter with conceptions of mens rea relevant to criminal cases illuminates distinctions and the ultimate problems associated with the incorporation of a scienter requirement in Rule 13b2-2. Historically, the state of mind of the accused has been an important element in the United States' system of justice. 81 Lawmakers have often included the words "willful" and "malicious" in criminal statutes to establish intent, or mens rea 82 required for a conviction. 83 Mens rea has a broader scope of culpability than scienter. 84 Negligence is the broadest tier of mens rea, creating culpability when the actor "should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk."
85 Recklessness builds on negligence by specifying a heightened requirement of "conscious disregard" of the substantial and unjustifiable risk. 86 Knowledge creates further culpability because the actor is "aware that it is practically certain that [the] conduct will cause a certain result." 87 The most culpable level of mens rea is purpose-consciously engaging in some conduct with the intention of causing the result.
88
Mens rea is a legal element of crime intended to protect the public from undeserved punishment. 89 Scienter is analogous to mens rea and is typically required in civil cases. Civil laws that include a private cause of action may include elements to protect individuals from frivolous lawsuits designed to compel a settlement.
101 Civil laws lacking a private cause of action exist to allow the government to protect the public and enforce laws; such laws may have lower pleading requirements and fewer elements to prove.
F. A Point of Confusion
While seemingly similar, there is an important distinction to be made between fraud charges relating to GAAP non-compliance and charges brought for a violation of Rule 13b2-2. Generally, scienter is an element that must be proven to prevail on fraud charges in relation to GAAP noncompliance.
103
Simply publishing inaccurate information may not 93 The government contended that Goyal made materially false statements to PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC"), the outside auditors to NAI.
Id
111
In 1998, NAI expanded from a direct sales distribution method by entering into sales agreements with distribution companies.
112
The government took issue with NAI's recording of revenue from these sales agreements, asserting that NAI prematurely recognized the revenues to be received and causing revenue to be overstated on the company's financial reports. 113 Weitzen and Todd participated in a conference call touting "accelerating revenue growth," and Weitzen prepared a press release stating the company had experienced "accelerated year-over-year revenue growth."
124
Amid a weakening demand for personal computers and record revenue reports by the company, the SEC investigated Gateway's claims. 125 During fiscal year 2000, a number of transactions were recorded improperly, artificially inflating revenue. 126 Gateway sold fixed assets to another company, Lockheed, which then leased the assets back to 114 Id. at 916. 115 Id. at 914. 116 Id.
117
Id. at 916. 118 Id. at 922 n.6 (emphasis added).
119
Id. at 922-23. 120 See generally SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011).
121
Id. at 1212.
122
Id. at 1213. 123 Id. at 1212. 124 Id. at 1213. 125 Id.
126
Id. at 1213-14.
Gateway. 127 Nevertheless, Gateway recorded the asset sale as revenue, a violation of GAAP. 128 Gateway had a sales agreement with VenServ that required a minimum number of referrals before Gateway would receive payment.
129 Gateway had not yet met the threshold, and accordingly had not yet been paid, but still reported the anticipated revenue. 130 An agreement with America Online ("AOL") was modified, changing the timing of payments to Gateway, resulting in a $72 million revenue boost.
131
The officers failed to disclose that this was not sustainable revenue growth, but instead a one-time transaction.
132
The SEC brought a suit against Todd and Manza alleging, among other things, a violation of Rule 13b2-2 for preparing and delivering false financial statements to PwC, Gateway's outside accountant and auditor. 133 Weitzen's alleged violation of Rule 13b2-2 stemmed from his signing the statements delivered to PwC.
134
On the Rule 13b2-2 claim, the district court granted summary judgment for Weitzen. 135 A jury found Todd and Manza liable for violating Rule 13b2-2, but the district court granted motions as a matter of law to set aside the jury verdict. 136 The SEC appealed the district court decisions.
137
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit, relying on United States v. Goyal, asserted that scienter was an element of Rule 13b2-2 138 and affirmed summary judgment in favor of Weitzen. 139 The court held that the SEC failed to prove scienter because it had not shown Weitzen had knowledge of the improperly booked transactions. 140 Similarly, Todd and Manza's judgments were affirmed because, based on the facts presented by the SEC, they did not know the letter to PwC was a false representation of the company's financials; they therefore lacked scienter. 141 Vital to the analysis of these two cases is that the court failed to distinguish between the criminal liability that Goyal was facing and the civil liability of Todd, Manza, and 127 Id. This information was not communicated to investors.
147 John Shanklin, a co-defendant, was an officer and director of both auto parts businesses, and was responsible for both companies' accounting and SEC filings. 148 The SEC alleged that Shanklin misrepresented or concealed the diverting of funds away from their intended purpose. 149 Further, they asserted that Shanklin knew or was reckless in failing to know about the misrepresentations. 150 After failing to file an answer to the allegations, the court entered a default judgment against Shanklin and McNulty. 151 Shanklin hired new counsel, and moved to vacate the default judgment against him. 152 He argued that, among other things, the SEC did not prove all elements of the claim because it failed to prove that he acted with scienter. 153 Although Shanklin admitted to signing false and incomplete disclosure forms for the SEC, he denied involvement in raising funds or knowledge of any misstatements in corporate filings. 154 The court held that section 13 of the 1934 Act and the SEC rules established thereunder "are provisions under which civil liability may be imposed without proof of scienter." 155 The court quoted its original opinion, describing Shanklin as a "sophisticated businessman," agreeing that he should be "responsible for the accuracy of the information" in the filings he signed. 156 The court held that Shanklin could not escape liability for misinformation contained in filings that he signed by blaming the preparer for their content. 157 In this regard, the court held Shanklin to a strict liability standard; he signed the filings and was therefore responsible for their content. 159 In Espuelas, the defendants were officers and directors of StarMedia, an Internet portal targeting Spanish and Portuguese markets. 160 The SEC's allegations revolved around the revenue reported by StarMedia.
161
The company was engaged in "barter transactions."
162 StarMedia sold advertising to generate revenue. 163 Under a reciprocal agreement, StarMedia would then purchase an equal dollar amount of advertising, resulting in a net zero revenue effect.
164 StarMedia failed to report these transactions as barter transactions, instead booking them as independent transactions. 165 The result was overstated revenue.
166
The company also engaged in contingent transactions, which artificially boosted revenue.
167
In these transactions, the company would present proposed advertising services to a client. 168 If the client accepted the proposal, the company would receive a larger sum than if the proposal was rejected. 169 The company would include the full revenue before the 155 Id. at 736. Id.
158
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 1644 (defining a wrong of strict liability as "a wrong in which a mens rea is not required because neither wrongful intent not culpable negligence is a necessary condition of responsibility"). 171 They also claimed to have included all sales agreements and asserted that no fraud was perpetrated by employees of the company, yet none of the reciprocal agreements or contingent agreements were communicated to the outside auditors.
172
The SEC brought charges against StarMedia officers for violating a multitude of Exchange Act rules, including SEC Rule 13b2-2 and other rules under section 13 of the Exchange Act. 173 The officers moved to dismiss the charges against them, but the court denied the motions. 174 The court stated there was no question materially misleading statements were made in letters to the independent auditor. 175 probation, restitution, or death. 179 Therefore, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required to convict on a criminal charge given the enhanced severity of possible penalties. 180 Civil remedies, on the other hand, result in less onerous punishments, such as monetary awards or some form of injunctive relief. 181 As such, the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, a lower standard. 182 Courts cannot apply the same burden of proof standards to civil and criminal cases. 183 To be punished criminally, one must act with some degree of scienter or mens rea. 184 If scienter is a required element for civil liability, it may be necessary to specifically identify it as such. 185 The Ninth Circuit analogized Goyal, a criminal case, to Todd, a civil case, to determine that scienter is required for liability under Rule 13b2-2. 186 Scienter is not an express element of Rule 13b2-2. 187 Because Todd was a civil case brought by the SEC for violation of a rule which does not require scienter, the Ninth Circuit erroneously relied on Goyal by holding that scienter was required for the respondents to be held civilly liable for their actions.
The Ninth Circuit instead should have looked to cases such as McNulty, which were analogous but not binding, to hold that a civil action brought by the SEC under a rule that does not require scienter should not be held to a higher requirement-requiring scienter. By enacting section 303, Congress verbalized its intention to protect the public interest and the interests of investors.
199 Section 303 declares unlawful any action that will mislead auditors for the purpose of causing the auditors' financial reports to be materially misleading.
200
The SEC is granted exclusive jurisdiction to enforce, in civil proceedings, any rule or regulation issued under this section. 201 There is no mention of "knowing" violations or "scienter" in the enabling statute. 202 Accordingly, a scienter element should not be added to Rule 13b2-2 based on legislative intent because it was promulgated under section 303. A court ruling that requires the SEC to prove scienter is tantamount to the court rewriting the enabling statute.
C. Subsequent SEC Rulemaking
Based on section 303(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC proposed an amendment of then-existing Rule 13b2-2 to conform to the new law. 203 In 189 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101.
190
Id. at § 302.
191
192
Id. at § 302(a).
193
Id. at § 302(a)4.
194
Id. at § 302(a)5.
195
Id. at § 302(a)6.
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Id. at § 302(a)(1).
197
Id. at § 302(a)2.
198
Id. at § 302(a)3.
199
Id. at § 303(a).
200
201
Id. at § 303(b). Specifically, the Commission solicited comments on the wording of the Rule addressing certain actions "to coerce, manipulate, mislead or fraudulently influence" auditors.
205
The SEC included this language to address these actions, creating civil liability for them regardless of the effect on audit results. 206 The Commission explicitly stated in the Rule proposal that the word "fraudulently" modified the word "influence" exclusively, and did not apply to the coercion, manipulation, or misleading elements of the Rule.
207
The SEC received comments suggesting that "fraudulently" should modify all of the actions, not only the influence aspect of the Rule.
208
Others suggested a materiality aspect to the misleading element, or that "any attempt to purposely skew the issuer's disclosure should violate the [R]ule."
209 Ernst & Young, one of the "Big Four" international accounting firms, 210 suggested that fraudulent intent should not be required for officers or directors, but should be required for third parties. 211 The SEC ultimately decided that the "fraudulently" modifier would apply only to the verb "influence."
212 To clarify the Rule, "fraudulently influence" was placed at the end of the sentence to ensure that only "influence" was subject to the "fraudulently" modifier.
213
Addressing the other comments, the Commission specified that Rule 13b2-2 historically prohibited making, or causing to be made, materially misleading statements to auditors, and the new Rule would not modify the existing standard. 214 The SEC reiterated that the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley is to restore investor confidence in financial reporting, and decided that codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 204 Id.
205
Improper Influence on Conduct of Audits, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,820, 31,820 (May 28, 2003) (to be codified at C.F.R. pt. 240) (emphasis added). 206 Id.
207
208
209
210
The term "big four" originates from the term "big eight," which was coined in the 1960s to describe the top eight largest international accounting firms. Throughout the years, the firms consolidated to five top firms. After the Enron scandal, Arthur Andersen ceased operations leaving the remaining "big four" as they are known today. There are two deference standards that courts may apply to determine whether to defer to an agency interpretation: Skidmore deference and Chevron deference. 216 Chevron deference is more frequently cited by the Supreme Court, and is a very deferential standard. 217 Chevron is often used when agencies use formal rulemaking, or rulemaking utilizing notice and comment rulemaking-as the SEC did with the promulgation of 13b2-2.
218
Skidmore is used less often, and is less deferential.
219 Skidmore is more frequently used for interpretive rules, which do not utilize notice and comment periods. 220 Under both doctrines, courts generally will defer to an administrative agency's interpretation of the authority granted to it. 221 In the interest of thorough analysis, a brief Skidmore discussion will be followed by a deeper Chevron analysis.
Skidmore Deference
Skidmore v. Swift was a Supreme Court case to determine whether to defer to an interpretive bulletin issued by the Administrator of Labor.
222
The employees verbally agreed to sleep on premises, and receive overtime pay only when answering alarms.
223
The employees then sued their employer for overtime pay for all their time spent on call, including when they were sleeping on premises.
224 Lower courts dismissed the workers' suit. 225 The Administrator of Labor bulletin suggested a flexible solution to consider the freedom of the employee to engage in personal activities, rather than an "all-in" or "all-out" approach to "on call" pay. 226 Deferring to the agency, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, allowing the 215 Id. Id.
218
Id. at 2123. 219 Id. at 2098. 220 Id. at 2123. 221 Id. at 2120. Id. at 135. 224 Id.
225
226
Id. at 138.
case to be heard to determine if the employers should determine if, and how much, employees should be compensated for this time where they may not be working, but are still limited in where they can go or what they can do. 227 The Court acknowledged that the agency interpretations are not binding on the Court, but that interpretations do "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."
228
It logically follows, therefore, that a court would likely defer to the SEC interpretation of the laws and rules based on its vast experience in securities law. Skidmore deference, applied to SEC's interpretation of Rule 13b2-2, would likely relieve the SEC from the need to prove scienter to prevail in a civil enforcement case.
Chevron Deference
Courts would more likely apply the Chevron doctrine when analyzing deference standards, because Rule 13b2-2 was subject to notice and comment, and was not merely an interpretive rule.
229
So long as the enabling statute was ambiguous, and the agency interpretation is reasonable, Chevron deference will apply. 230 Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council is a Supreme Court case establishing a two-part test. 231 The first part of the test is to determine if Congress' intent was clear, or if the statute is ambiguous. 232 If the statute is found to be ambiguous, the court will move to the second part of the analysis, deciding if the agency interpretation was permissible based on the statute as written. 233 The Chevron case involved the Clean Air Act passed by Congress, which required polluters to obtain a permit before constructing any new or modified "stationary sources" of pollution. 234 In interpreting the statute, the EPA promulgated a rule creating a "bubble policy" regarding the stationary sources, 235 grouping together pollution emitting devices within a facility.
236
As a result, modifications to equipment occurring within a "bubble" would not require the permit under the EPA regulation.
227
Id. at 139-40. 228 Id. at 140. Id. at 842-43. 232 Id.
233
Id. at 843. 234 Id. at 848-49. 235 Id. 840-41. 236 Id. at 840. 237 See id. at 855.
The Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") is one of several environmental-action groups who sought judicial review of the EPA regulation of permit requirements for modifications, or new construction, within an existing "bubble." 238 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the regulation, holding that the EPA "bubble policy" did not appropriately define a polluting facility. 239 The Supreme Court overturned the appellate court decision. 240 First, the Court analyzed the enabling statute, the Clean Air Act, finding that the Act "does not explicitly define what Congress envisioned as a 'stationary source' to which the permit program . . . should apply." 241 Nor could intent be ascertained in the legislative history.
242
Finding the meaning of a stationary source to be ambiguous in the statute, the Court moved to the second part of the test, holding that the agency interpretation "represented a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests and was entitled to deference."
243
Chevron is the primary basis for judicial deference to agency interpretations when statutes are ambiguous, and the agency interpretation is reasonable.
E. Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Ambiguity Element
The first part of the analysis under Chevron is to determine if the enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter requirement. 245 The enabling statute, Sarbanes-Oxley § 303, is divided into four parts. Part (a) is the substantive law that will be analyzed for ambiguity.
246 Parts (b), (c), and (d) discuss enforcement authority, preemption of other laws, and deadlines for SEC rulemaking respectively. 247 Section 303(a) charges the SEC with creating rules as it deems "necessary and appropriate" to protect the public and investors from 238 Id. at 837. 239 Id. at 841. 240 Id. at 866. 241 Id. at 837. 242 Id.
243
Id. at 865. 244 See generally Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (holding the enabling statute was ambiguous in defining "telecommunications service," and the FCC interpretation was a reasonable policy choice, therefore the FCC is entitled to Chevron Deference); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United States, 142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plain language of the statute failed to expressly provide a valuation method, and the agency interpretation was not unreasonable given the purpose of the statute, granting Chevron Deference to the IRS). 245 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. misinformation provided to auditors by directors and officers of companies. 248 Specifically, the statute forbids officers or directors, or anyone acting at their behest, from taking "any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead" accounting professionals or auditors "for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading." 249 Ambiguity arises in the statute when determining whether misinformation must be given intentionally, or whether negligence is enough for a violation to occur. Notably, the statute "contains no words indicating that Congress intended to impose a 'scienter' requirement," such as knowingly or willfully. 250 Criminal liability for rule violation expressly carries a "knowingly" requirement. 251 However, the SEC may only bring civil enforcement cases against defendants. 252 Because the statute expressly mentions criminal enforcement, but is silent on civil enforcement, ambiguity exists as to a scienter requirement for civil enforcement. This ambiguity leads to part two of the Chevron test, to determine if the SEC interpretation is reasonable.
F. Rule 13b2-2 Deference Analysis Under Chevron: The Reasonableness Element
Interpretations made by the SEC regarding the Rule are reasonable, and therefore entitled to deference as long as they are not (1) arbitrary and capricious, or (2) contrary to the language of the statute.
248
Id. The language of the statute is as follows:
(a) Rules to prohibit It shall be unlawful, in contravention of such rules or regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary and appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, for any officer or director of an issuer, or any other person acting under the direction thereof, to take any action to fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements materially misleading. 249 Id. 1979) ); see also 17 C.F.R. 240.13b2-2 (stating that no director or officer of an issuer, in connection with an audit or examination of the issuer's financial statements or the preparation of any document or report to be filed with the Commission, directly or indirectly shall (a) make or cause to be made a materially false or misleading statement to an accountant or (b) omit to state, or cause another person to omit to state, any material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading to an accountant). McConville, 465 F.3d at 786; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Arbitrary and Capricious (Rational Basis)
The arbitrary and capricious test, established by the Supreme Court in the early 1940's and also known as the "rational basis" test, was codified in 1946 in the APA, providing a basis for judicial review of agency actions. 255 The test consists of two factors. 256 First, the rule will be analyzed to determine if it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose, as opposed to a general governmental purpose. 257 Second, the court must decide if the rule is rationally related to that purpose. 258 
i. Legitimate Statutory Government Purpose
Rule 13b2-2 satisfies the first part of the arbitrary and capricious test because it furthers a legitimate statutory governmental purpose. The Congressional intent was to protect investors from directors and officers who provide information to auditors that may produce misleading results.
259
The resulting Rule created by the SEC clarifies and expands on the original Rule 13B-2 by specifically prohibiting officers and directors from "improperly influencing" auditors. 260 The new Rule also applies these rules to audits of investment company financial statements.
261
Congress intended for courts, when applying the arbitrary and capricious standard, to consider the agency purpose and means for regulating behavior on a rational basis standard of review. 
ii. Rational Relation to the Legitimate Purpose
The SEC interpretation of the enabling statute need not be the only possible interpretation of the statute, or the interpretation that the court would have chosen.
263
The SEC rule simply must be a permissible interpretation of the statutory language.
264
Agency rules should not be disturbed when the rule addresses conflicting policy concerns between the agency, other organizations or the public, and is within the bounds of the Conflicting policy concerns were indeed considered when Rule 13b2-2 was adopted in 2003. 266 The SEC noted that during the notice and comment period, comments from banking institutions and auditing firms expressed a concern that a negligence standard would cause a "chilling effect" on communications between officers and directors, and between auditors.
267
The SEC claimed these concerns were based on an incorrect assumption; that the SEC has not historically enforced the negligent communication of misleading information in the past. 268 Instead, for many years the SEC has brought enforcement actions of that very type based on the "known or should have known" standard.
269
A court deciding if a rule is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of the statute must engage in a subjective analysis, but the facts make it hard to argue that it is not. The final rule press release discusses the comments received during the notice and comment period, explaining misconceptions and clarifying the purpose of the rule. 270 It explains the historical and continued use of the negligence standard, and how that relates to the language of the enabling statute. 271 It also affirmed that the commission had no intention to hold parties accountable for "honest and reasonable" accounting errors, as opposed to negligent or intended fraud.
272
The commission also reinforces the underlying policy purpose of restoring investor confidence in the audit process. 
Contrary to the Language of the Statute
While some may argue that there is no ambiguity in the underlying statute, questioning the validity of the Rule, to argue that the Rule is contrary to the statute would be a further stretch. The statute tasks the SEC to create a rule to protect investors by declaring unlawful any actions that can lead to materially misleading financial statements. 274 The Rule that the SEC adopted serves that purpose, and in no way conflicts with the letter or 265 Id. at 845 (citing United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961) To summarize the deference analysis of Rule 13b2-2, Chevron analysis is preferred over Skidmore analysis because the Rule was created with a notice and comment period, and is not simply an interpretive rule. Applying Chevron, the enabling statute is ambiguous as to a scienter requirement, meaning courts will defer to the SEC so long as their rule is reasonable. The Rule is reasonable because it is not arbitrary or capricious, it is rationally related to a legitimate purpose, and it is not contrary to the underlying statute. Therefore, courts should defer to the SEC interpretation of Sarbanes-Oxley section 303, and permit enforcement of Rule 13b2-2 as written, using a negligence standard.
G. Supreme Court Decisions
Before Hochfelder, 276 courts generally held that violations of the Securities Acts were held to a negligence standard. 277 From the inception of the SEC in the 1940s, courts used a broad reading of the rules, and evaluated the end result of an action to determine liability.
278
Courts decided the cases based on the facts and the SEC rule, but did not make a thorough scienter analysis. 279 Through the 1960s, courts continued to look at the legislative intent behind the statutes and SEC rules, leaning more towards a negligence standard than a scienter standard.
280
To date, decisions of the circuit courts and Supreme Court have been split regarding the reasoning for, and requirement of, scienter to be proven in SEC enforcement actions. See Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding that the defendants' assertion that genuine fraud must be alleged and proven is not sufficient. The court stated that "any manipulative device or contrivance" in contravention of the rules was to be read broadly, again affirming that scienter was not an element required for liability."). 281 See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) ("We hold that the scienter requirement enunciated in Hochfelder is not applicable to government enforcement actions brought under § § 10(b) and 21(d) of the 1934 Act. Consistent with the pre-Hochfelder decisions of this Court, we continue to hold that allegations and proof of negligence alone will suffice, for the reasons stated below.").
address the elements required to enforce securities rules.
282 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. involved a company that issued research reports via subscription. 283 The company purchased shares of securities on six separate occasions before recommending them in a research report.
284
After recommending the securities, the price and volume rose, and the company liquidated its shares to capture a gain. 285 None of the trades were disclosed to the subscribers of the analyst reports.
286
The SEC requested a preliminary injunction to enforce the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. 287 The district court denied the injunction, holding that the words "fraud" and "deceit" required a knowledge and intent on the part of Capital Gains to injure their clients. 288 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision five-to-four. 289 The dissenting judges opined that the business climate had matured from the inceptions of common law fraud 290 and deceit, and a broader interpretation must be adopted to suit the securities industry.
291
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the securities laws required intent to cause injury, or whether a broad interpretation of the rules should be used.
292
The Court discussed the financial landscape leading to the 1940 Act, and the need for regulation. 293 The Court noted that the Act regulated actions taken by an advisor consciously or subconsciously that may affect the advisor's financial interests. 294 The Court held that Congress "intended the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation 'enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds.'" 295 The Court assumed that Congress was not ignorant to the changes in financial landscape since the doctrine of common law fraud was established, and held that securities legislation must be read broadly to 282 SEC v. Capital Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). 283 Id. at 182-83. 284 Id. at 183. 285 
Id.
286
See id. 287 Id.
288
Id. at 184. Id.
293
Id. at 188. 294 Id.
295
Id. at 195 (emphasis added).
encompass the legislative intent of the statutes.
296 Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower court decision, and remanded in favor of the SEC injunction. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder was a private action brought by investors under the Securities Act of 1934 against the auditor of a brokerage firm that was responsible for auditing and filing the annual reports of the securities firm. 298 The plaintiffs alleged that Ernst and Ernst ("Ernst") aided and abetted the firm by failing to detect fraudulent actions, in violation of section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule 10b-5. 299 The district court rejected Ernst's contention that fraud charges could not be brought on negligence grounds, but dismissed the case due to inadequate facts to support the action. 300 The Circuit Court reversed, holding that Ernst had a duty to inquire and disclose, and by breaching that duty, was liable to the investors.
301
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if a private action can succeed absent a finding of "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 302 The Court looked at the legislative intent of the enabling statute contained in the 1934 Act and subsequent SEC rulemaking. 303 The Court also looked at the language of the statute, and was unconvinced by the suggestion of the SEC that Congressional intent and prior case law lean towards a flexible interpretation, instead holding that the language clearly supported the necessity to prove scienter.
304
The SEC also failed to convince the Court that Congress would explicitly require scienter when it intended to include it as an element, using section 9(e) as an example: "any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction . . . ."
305
The Court explored legislative intent independently, holding Congress failed to explicitly answer whether scienter would be required.
306 "Neither the intended scope of [s]ection 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly in the legislative history of the 296 Id. The Court ultimately ruled that the language of the Rule required scienter to be proven for liability, and declined to extend liability to negligent conduct. 309 The dissent in Hochfelder read the language of the SEC rule to apply to negligent and intentional conduct alike. 310 Aside from the language of the statute, the dissent also opined that the statutes were enacted for the "broad, needed, and deserving benefit" of the victim investors.
311
After the Hochfelder decision, district and circuit courts either cited to Hochfelder, dismissing for lack of scienter, 312 or distinguished cases to find liability absent scienter. 313 Courts generally held that the Hochfelder holding, based on a private action, was not applicable to SEC enforcement actions, and holdings prior to Hochfelder continued to be binding. 314 The Aaron v. SEC decision would resolve that issue in 1980.
The Aaron Decision: Scienter Required
Aaron v. SEC applied the decision in Hochfelder to the SEC as well as private plaintiffs, and analyzed sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3) to determine if scienter is a required element to be proven. 315 It is this reasoning and analysis that are important to the present analysis of Rule 13b2-2. Aaron was a manager at a New York broker-dealer. 316 He supervised two brokers who repeatedly disseminated false information about a company, despite warnings from the company itself and lawyers involved with the 307 See id. at 202. 308 Id. at 206 (citing S. REP. NO. 73-792, at 13 (1934) Aaron was aware, but failed to prevent the brokers from misleading their clients. 318 The SEC sought an injunction in district court under Rule 10b-5 and sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3).
319
The district court granted the injunction, noting that "negligence alone might suffice to establish a violation," but holding that the intentional failure to stop the dissemination of misleading statements was also sufficient to establish scienter. 320 The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that "proof of negligence alone will suffice" for a SEC enforcement action.
321
The Court pointed out that the Hochfelder court did not decide whether scienter is required for SEC enforcement actions. 322 The appellate court cited SEC v. Coven 323 and its analysis of the scienter requirement under section 17(a), holding that the language of the statute did not require intent, and that Congress considered a scienter requirement, but ultimately "opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like."
324
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if scienter was a required element of these SEC rules. 325 This analysis can be applied to Rule 13b2-2 as well. Without much analysis, the Court quoted the Hochfelder decision, extending that holding to SEC enforcement cases as well. 326 The Court failed to distinguish a private cause of action from an enforcement action, and failed to consider the common law fraud doctrine analysis made by the Capital Gains Court.
327
While acknowledging Congressional intent to enact legislation protecting investors against fraud with rules "to be construed 'not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes,'" 328 the Court instead insisted that the language of the statute did not permit an interpretation in line with the intent of Congress.
329
The Court then picked apart sections 17(a)(1), (2), and (3), holding that 17(a)(1) required a showing of scienter, but 17(a)(2), and (a)(3) did not 317 Id. at 683. 318 
Id.
319
See id. at 684. 320 Id. require scienter. 330 In so holding, the Court pointed to the language of 17(a)(1), specifically the words "device," "scheme," and "artifice," which the Court stated "all connote knowing or intentional practices."
331 Section 17(a)(1) also shares the word "device" with Rule 10b-5, and borrowing from the Hochfelder analysis, the Court maintained that "device" embraces a scienter requirement. 332 Analyzing 17(a)(2), the Court held that the language of the Rule did not require scienter, instead looking at the end result, and not the intent behind, the regulated conduct. 333 The Court said the language of the Rule prohibits "any type of material misstatement or omission . . . that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not." 334 Similarly, the Court looked at the language contained in Rule 17(a)(3), specifically language proscribing engagement "in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit." 335 The Court, analogizing 17(a)(3) to the analysis of section 206(2) of the 1940 Act in Capital Gains, held that under 17(a)(3), deliberate action is not required to protect investors. 336 The dissenting opinion in Aaron calls for distinguishing between a private action and a SEC enforcement action. 337 Justice Blackmun stated that the language was not as clear as the majority suggested. 338 A historical argument of legal tradition also distinguished between common law fraud at law requiring scienter, and a suit in the court of chancery at equity, that did not require intent. 339 Finally, Blackmun briefly reviewed legislative intent, discussing various state securities laws that led to, and provided a model for federal law. 340 These laws empowered state attorneys general to bring suit for injunctive relief whenever fraudulent conduct was uncovered, intentional or not. 341 scienter should not be an element of SEC enforcement actions under Rule 13b2-2. The Supreme Court has analyzed three major factors when evaluating the securities rules (1) the statutory language, (2) the legislative intent, and (3) historical context.
i. Statutory Language
The Supreme Court has held that words like "device,"
343 "scheme,"
344 and "artifice" 345 are all words that indicate the need to prove scienter. Neither Sarbanes-Oxley section 303(a) nor Rule 13b2-2 contains those terms. 346 Further, the language of Rule 13b2-2 looks to the end result; that is to prevent materially false or misleading information from being communicated to auditors. 347 Neither willfulness nor intent is indicated as a factor in determining whether the Rule has been violated. 348 Like sections 17(a)(2) and (3), Rule 13b2-2 does not require deliberate conduct to carry out the purpose of the Rule to protect investors. 349 
ii. Legislative Intent
The Capital Gains Court assumed that Congress, in enacting the statute, was aware of the changing landscape of the securities industry, holding that the securities laws must be interpreted broadly to carry out the intent of Congress, to protect investors. 350 The Hochfelder Court discounted the SEC assertions that Congress included the words "willfully" or "intentionally" when required, and referred to a report that indicated that misstatements or omissions made in good faith were not actionable. 351 The Aaron Court borrowed from Hochfelder in its analysis of section 17(a)(1) looking for legislative intent in the language of the statute. 352 Absent the shared language of Rule 10b-5, the Court looked to the end result that Congress wanted to prevent when analyzing sections 17(a)(2) and (3). 354 Based on the Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law it is fair to assume that, if Congress was not aware of the modern financial landscape and how it differs from the days when the doctrine of common law fraud was developed, it is now. Congress is now on constructive notice of the need to be explicit in the realm of securities law, having seen the cases that have come before the various circuit courts and the Supreme Court.
355 And yet, Congress has opted not to use the words "willful" or "intentional" in the statute. 356 The language of the statute does indeed seek to regulate an end result, and as such should be interpreted broadly to carry out its function.
Compare and Contrast with other SEC Rules
Omission of an explicit scienter requirement is not conclusive proof that the SEC is not required to prove scienter when enforcing a rule. 357 For instance, Rule 13b2-2 does not contain an explicit scienter requirement.
358
But the SEC has enacted other rules that do not explicitly require scienter, yet the Supreme Court has found scienter to be a required element for finding a violation of the Rule. 359 These rules can be distinguished from 13b2-2 by analyzing the statute and the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Arguably the most commonly enforced SEC rule, Rule 10b-5 forbids material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 360 While the language of the statute does not explicitly require scienter for civil liability, the Supreme Court has held that scienter is required to prevail on a civil 10b-5 charge. 361 Specifically, the Court held 
355
356
357
See generally 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2011). The Supreme Court has ruled that these rules, while not explicitly stating a scienter requirement, do require the SEC to prove the element of scienter. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ and device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. that use of the words "manipulative and deceptive" to modify "device or contrivance" in section 10(b) strongly suggests an element of scienter.
362
Such an outcome is unsurprising, and is consistent with one of the major components of the Aaron decision. 363 Recall, in Aaron v. SEC, the Supreme Court affirmed that the requirement to establish scienter to prevail on a 10b-5 action applies when the SEC is the plaintiff as well. 364 The holding also affirmed the analysis of the language of section 10(b), pointing out that "'manipulative,' 'deceptive,' and 'contrivance' clearly refer to knowing and intentional misconduct." 365 The Court added that the legislative history indicated an intention to include a scienter requirement. 366 To establish liability for a violation under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, a plaintiff must establish scienter. 367 Like any other plaintiff, the scienter requirement applies to the SEC as well. 368 In Aaron, the Supreme Court analyzed the statutory language "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," and held that the legislature clearly intended for scienter to be an element of the offense. 369 Comparing the language of 17(a)(1) to the Hochfelder ruling regarding Rule 10b-5, the Court held that inclusion of the word "device" was indicative of a scienter requirement in 17(a)(1), just as the Hochfelder Court held it was for Rule 10b-5. 370 The Supreme Court has contrasted the language in section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5 that require scienter, to the language of section 17(a)(2) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 that do not. 371 The language of 17(a)(2), "to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, Id. at 696. 368 Id. at 701-02. 369 Id. at 696. 370 Id.
371
Id. at 697. not misleading," does not indicate that intent to defraud is required. 372 The making of an untrue statement does not indicate intent; merely making the statement, with or without intent, violates the Rule. 373 Contrast the making of a statement with employing a device, scheme or artifice to defraud; employing indicates not only mere action, but also intention to defraud. 374 Taking calculated steps to defraud, versus making misleading statements that can be made knowingly or unknowingly, is the difference between the requirement to prove scienter or not.
Analysis of section 17(a)(3) yields similar results. 375 The Aaron Court looked at the end result, not the action leading to that result, to determine if scienter is an element to be proven for a violation. 376 Here the statute prohibits engagement "in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser." 377 The Court held that deliberate dishonesty is not required, analogizing the language of the statute with similar language in section 206(2) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940 that also did not require "deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors." 378 statement . . . ," 384 and 17(a)(3), which reads "to engage in any transaction, practice or course of business which would operate as a fraud . . . ." 385 These rules are common in that they do not employ a scheme or artifice to defraud, nor do they use a device to defraud.
A Scienter Requirement is a High Hurdle to Overcome
Requiring the SEC to prove scienter in a Rule 13b2-2 civil enforcement action is akin to providing a negligence defense to defendants. Directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to provide accurate financial information to accountants and auditors. 386 By requiring the SEC to prove scienter when misleading information is given, defendants who, as a result of actual negligent behavior or as a result of intentional behavior disguised as simple negligence, become immune to SEC enforcement actions to remedy past or prevent future fraud.
The SEC is up against a powerful force-greed. Greed is a naturally motivating human instinct. 387 A driver for positive creativity, efficiency, and success, greed can also be dangerous if left unchecked, transforming from a positive motivator to a negative motivator to seek gains without regard to the consequences of others. 388 This negative motivator, combined with a scienter requirement, makes it worthwhile for one to misrepresent information for their personal or corporate gain, knowing full well that the ability of the SEC, as well as the private class action litigator, is limited and unlikely to succeed.
The Private Litigation Securities Reform Act of 1995 ("PLSRA") was designed to prevent abuses by class action private plaintiffs by requiring, among other things, increased specificity of the misleading information alleged, "pleading with particularity the facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter," and a halt to discovery until the first two elements are met. 389 These requirements act as a hurdle to be jumped before their action can move forward. 390 settlements. 391 These purposes do not translate to the SEC, having no stake in the outcome except that of fulfilling their mission, which is to protect investors. In sum, a negligence standard would hold directors and officers to the professional standard required of their position, and allow the SEC to carry out their work of protecting the markets and the investing public.
The SEC Has Limited Resources to Carry Out Its Mission
The SEC, unlike other government agencies, is not self-funded; the agency does not receive the fines it imposes, it receives a budget annually from Congress. 392 Currently the SEC employs 4,200 employees, who monitor "more than 25,000 market participants, including broker-dealers, investment advisers, mutual funds and exchange traded funds, municipal advisors, clearing agents, transfer agents, and 18 exchanges." 393 In fact, the SEC budget has been cut recently, despite revenue produced from fines and penalties roughly doubling the prior year budget, and a twenty five percent budget increase proposed by the SEC Chair. 394 Decreased budgets and limited staffing, combined with new laws, are increasing the SEC workload, further limiting it from carrying out its mission.
The Commission's ability to properly enforce the rules and protect the investing public is limited. 395 Many incidents are not prosecuted due to limited SEC resources. 396 Requiring the Commission to prove scienter for a Rule 13b2-2 contributes to the strain of an already underfunded agency, and is contrary to the congressional intent both in creating the Commission, but also more importantly is contrary to the purpose of enacting section 303 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Directors and Officers Can Be Protected for Good Faith Misstatements
Corporations can purchase insurance to protect directors and officers of the company from personal liability. 397 Known as "D&O Insurance," these policies can cover the cost of litigation, and financial liability for the analysis in Hochfelder, requiring scienter for SEC enforcement actions of section 17(a), and binding later courts to the decision, or forcing them to distinguish from Aaron.
Most importantly though are the analyses the Court used to arrive at these holdings, and the application of those analyses to Rule 13b2-2 to predict how the Court would rule. The broad interpretation in Capital Gains, the private enforcement specified in Hochfelder, and the similarity of Rule 13b2-2 to the analysis of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) in Aaron, all lead to the conclusion that, if the Supreme Court were to grant certiorari to decide whether the SEC is required to prove the element of scienter in an enforcement action, it would rule in the negative.
From a policy perspective, to require the SEC to prove scienter in a Rule 13b2-2 enforcement action is counter-intuitive. The SEC was created to enact and enforce rules to instill confidence in the financial markets and to protect investors. There is no pecuniary gain for the SEC in an enforcement action. Any action taken by the Commission is in the best interest of investors and the financial markets. To "tie its hands" by requiring it to prove the element of scienter in a 13b2-2 action is tantamount to providing a defense for any director or officer who misleads an auditor, except for the most egregious circumstances. A negligence standard holds directors and officers to a standard that the investing public expects and deserves.
